Automatic systems and the low-level wind hazard by Schaeffer, Dwight R.
N8 7- 25279
AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS AND THE LOW-LEVEL WIND HAZARD
Dwight R. Schaeffer
Avionics Division
Sperry Flight System
ABSTRACT
Automatic flight control systems provide means for significantly enhancing
survivability in severe wind hazards. The technology required to produce the
necessary control algorithms is available and has been made technically feasible
by the advent of digital flight control systems and accurate, low-noise sensors,
especially strap-down inertial sensors. The application of this technology and
these meanshas not generally been enabled except for automatic landing systems,
and even then the potential has not been fully exploitea. To fully exploit the
potential of automatic systems for enhancing safety in wind hazards requires
providing incentives, creating demand, inspiring competition, education, and
eliminating prejudicial disincentives to overcome the economic penalties asso-
ciated with the extensive and risky development and certification of these sys-
tems. If these changes will come about at all, it will likely be through changes
in the regulations provided by the certifying agencies.
INTRODUCTION
The task of improving aircraft safety for the low-level wind hazard takes
two forms:
I) Detection and avoidance;
2) Enhanced survivability.
The approaches emphasized for survivability have been:
• Pilot training and procedures;
• Airframe/engine capability;
• Displays and annunciations.
Another approach that currently receives less emphasis than the others, but
which offers greater potential, is the use of automatic systems, both coupled
systems, which control aircraft motion unassisted, and director systems, to pro-
vide commands which the pilot controls.
Simulations of low-level shear hazards that have been associated with major
incidents have confirmed the marginal ability or inability of pilots to cope with
the hazard. Yet, the same simulations are used to demonstrate the high capability
of automatic systems not only to survive the hazard, but to maintain precision
tracking. Too often, major incidents occur after the pilot has turned off his
automatic system, either by choice or by requirement.
Automatic systems have the ability to receive and quickly process large
amounts of data simultaneously, and, thereby provide much quicker detection
and reaction to a wind hazard than a pilot. The time to detect and react is
frequently more important than the magnitude of the control applied. The longer
the detection/reaction time, the greater the magnitude of the control required.
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On the other hand, the pilot frequently has advantages of:
• Greater control authority and rate capability;
• Flexibility and adaptability;
• Less susceptibility to hazardous reaction to failures;
• Access to more controls, particularly secondary controls.
The advantages the pilot has over automatic systems are generally not
inherent; the technology required to reduce or eliminate these advantages is
available. Enabling the application of, or creating the demand for, this
technology is the challenge.
In the following, the available technology and other potential means and
needs for enhancing the capability of automatic systems to cope with wind hazards
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CONTROL ALGORITHMS
At one time, the unavailability of quality sensors and computational capa-
bility for a reasonable amount of analog hardware restricted control algorithms
to little more than a raw error signal 6perated on by a proportional gain.
integral control and gain, and perhaps a rate damping term. A few gains dictated
all aspects of automatic control; stability, tracking performance, activity in
response to sensor noise and disturbances, and response to commands. Development
of the control algorithms was more an exercise of seeking the best compromise.
Sometimes filtering was added to reduce the effect of high-frequency activity
from noise and disturbances, thereby p.ermitting higher gaihs, but.the tracking
performance from the higher gains was largely offset by the adverse effect fi _-
tering had on stability and performance. Any increase in performance had an
attendant increase in disconcerting activity and a tendency towards limit cycling
due to rate saturation. The most important feature of the automatic mode,
particularly speed control modes (by elevator or throttle) operating in a changing
wind environment, may well have been the disconnect buttons or, at least, those
buttons that revert to pitch and roll altitude command modes and allow the
pilots to be the outer loop algorithms. Not only was there a hesitancy to seek
higher levels of tracking performance for the variable wind environment (a fruitless
exercise since the pilot would disengage the system due to the high level of
attendant non-productive activity), there were overt attempts to degrade perfor-
mance for the more severe wind environment so that the non-productive activity
would remain within acceptable bounds (the "TURB" button).
The introduction of the digital computer has provided a tremendous computa-
tional capability. Combined with the new generation of high-accuracy, low-noise
digital sensors, especially strap-down inertial sensors, a new architecture for
control algorithms has been enabled.
The former error signals can be split into the target and feedback
components, which are processed separately before combining to
form new error signals.
The targets can be processed linearly and non-linearly to shape and
control target acquisition without affecting stability and response
to noise and disturbances.
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• The feedback signals can be blended with inertial data to provide
a signal having the static accuracy of the raw feedback signal and
the low-noise, high-dynamic accuracy of the inertial signal without
significant effects on stability and tracking performance. This
blending can include the removal of sensor location effects resulting
from coupling with angular motion.
Comparisonof air data and inertial data can be performed to derive
wind componentsand their derivatives which can then be processed
linearly and non-linearly before re-introduction into the feedback
signal. This allows a high degree of independencebetween response
to shear, response to turbulence, still air tracking performance,
and stability.
The derived wind componentscan be used for predictive control
corrections that are applied as the wind disturbance occurs, but
before feedback signal disturbances, thereby preventing the signal
disturbances.
e The derived wind signals can be used predictively to remove the
deterministic "noisy" responses of inertial signals to turbulence.
The result of applying these and other techniques is a muchhigher level of
tracking performance for the previous level of unproductive activity. The feed-
back gains for attitude and path control functions can now be increased to the
stability limits with virtually no increase in activity due to turbulence and no
adverse effect on target capture performance.
For modesthat control airplane motion relative to the air mass, principally
airspeed modes, the trade-off between performance activity remains, though weaker
and with muchbetter performance for the sameactivity. This is principally due
to the still imperfect inability to distinguish between the wind speed changes
that will continue (shear?) and those that abruptly change (turbulence?).
The development of these modern control algorithms to maximize tracking
performances in winds with acceptable activity and good maneuvering characteris-
tics, required to gain the pilots trust and acceptance, does not comecheaply,
quickly, nor without high technical risks. They, therefore, tend to be applied
for terminal area modesonly where required, specifically for Category III auto-
matic landing, where the regulations on touchdown dispersions and airspeed control
in winds are very stringent.
The availability of Category III automatic landing systems is limited prin-
cipally to commercial transports. They are not used extensively for long-range
aircraft due to the need for the pilot and co-pilot to perform a minimumnumber
of manual landings each month to maintain their proficiency and to the limited
numberof landings available.
Category I and II automatic approach systems do not require tracking as tight
nor do they require autothrottles. Hence, the survivability they provide in severe
winds is not as good.
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Whencoupled go-around modesare provided, they frequently do not provide
closed-loop speed and path control, but only assure positive acceleration and
vertical speed for a range of weights and thrust in still air. Go-around flight
director modesmayconsist of nothing more than a fixed-pitch attitude command.
Coupled takeoff modesare not provided at all, even though an airplane
fully equipped for a Category III-B automatic landing is also equipped to per-
form a "Category III-B automatic takeoff", if regulations existed to cover such
a mode. Oneargumentagainst such a modeis the lack of airports equipped with
localizer deviation or the equivalent to enable steering downthe runway for
takeoffs. A similar argument was used against Category III-B automatic landings.
Coincidently, whenthe latest commercial aircraft were being developed with
Category III-B automatic landing capability as standard equipment, there was an
explosion in the numberof Category III-B certified airports in the U.S.
Like the go-around function, the automatic takeoff pitch control function
is essentially a speed control task. By controling speed, thrust in excess of
that required for level flight is converted to vertical speed. Complexity may
be added to prevent selecting too low a speed (by estimating the equivalent of
a minimumspeed using angle of attack, inertial data, and configuration sensors)
and to force a thrust deficiency to cause a speed reduction rather than a loss
of altitude. Additional complexity is needed for the takeoff flight director
to accommodatethe pilot's rotation without over-shooting the attitude required
for stabilized speed.
By employing airspeed and vertical speed blended with inertial data and
inertial acceleration, speed control through pitch control can counteract the
effects of variable winds. However, manytakeoff flight directors provide
nothing more than a fixed-pitch attitude commandfor all conditions. Even
proposed advancedconcepts plan to pre-compute a fixed-pitch attitude command
based on pilot-entered weight, expected thrust, configuration, and ambient
pressure and temperature. This attitude commandwould then result in the
correct climb-out airspeed when controlled, but only in still air.
Takeoff autothrottles rapidly advance thrust to a selected setting, then
disengage during the ground run at a predetermined airspeed so as to protect
against a failure that could cause a thrust reduction. Wheneverexcess field
length exists for the available thrust, the choice is invariably madeto reduce
the thrust setting so as to save engine life rather than to use all the thrust
to accelerate to a higher rotation and climb-out in order to increase climb
capability and speed margins. With the autothrottle inhibited from engagement,
it does not attempt to detect an energy deficiency, as mayoccur in variable
winds, and then advance thrust to the maximumavailable.
CONTROL AUTHORITY AND FAILURE PROTECTION
The classic method of preventing a failure that could cause an automatic
system to command so much control surface so as to cause structural failure or
a dangerous maneuver is to limit the control surface that can be commanded to
a "safe" maneuver level. This limiting is achieved by servo displacement limits
or by limiting the force or torque the servo can produce against the force or
torque from the surface hinge moments or the control feel unit. The problem
with this technique is that it also limits the control authority available to a
non-failed system to counteract the effects of severe disturbances.
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The "fail-safe" maneuver becomes excessive for operation near the ground,
yet the control authority required at low speeds, even in still air, may easily
exceed the fail-safe limits. Hence, for a Category III automatic landing system,
two or more systems, each with their own servos, are used with their limited
authorities summed to increase control authority when the multiple systems work
together. When one system fails, the good systems counteract the failed system's
command.
The control authority available from simultaneous multiple automatic systems
is seldom provided for other than automatic landing systems and even then may
not match the capability of the pilot. An aircraft equipped with a Category Ill
automatic landing system is equipped to provide multiple system operation for all
flight phases; therefore, it enhances survivability in severe winds. The addi-
tional expense is associated with much more testing and is substantial.
Most aircraft, especially smaller aircraft, are not equipped for Category
Ill automatic landings because of the high cost, weight, and power consumption
of the redundant equipment.
Digital computers have enabled an alternative approach--the self-monitored
system. The processing capability is used to analytically detect failures in
sensors, servos, and within the processor itself. This approach can eliminate
the need for multiple servos for fail passivity and authority limiting fail safety,
but the development and testing of the monitors required is very extensive and
expensive.
The monitoring approach can also be used to raise low rate limits applied
to protect against oscillatory failure and flutter coupling. These low-rate
limits not only prevent the control command from keeping up with the disturbance,
but, when saturated, can also cause a biased target or unstable limit cycling.
Pitch control authority can be further enhanced by quickening the trim
response to trim command and increasing trim rate. Trim motion is typically
delayed in response to a trim command all the time in order to prevent the trim
from increasing the maneuver response to a hardover failure before a pilot
reacts to the fault. Failure monitoring can eliminate the requirement for the
delay. The trim rate available to the automatic system is typically half or
less than that available to the pilot, although there is no failure requirement
to force this disparity.
The subject of authority also includes lift. Some automatic functions are
designed to prevent the attainment of additional lift near stall that might
otherwise be used to prevent loss of altitude in a severe wind hazard. Systems
that are allowed to operate near stall must be disconnected upon .the onset of
stall in order to prevent the natural automatic control reaction that is opposite
to that required for stall recovery. To enable the additional lift near stall
to be available, a very high accuracy and performance control algorithm is re-
quired to prevent stall, yet not interfere with very near-stall lift attainment.
INCENTIVE/DISINCENTIVE
The major challenge of enhancing safety for wind hazard, no matter what the
means, is enabling the application of technology. This is a matter of creating
incentives, eliminating disincentives, or creating disincentives for not
enhancing safety. Sources of these incentive/disincentives are interrelated and
include:
169
• Regulations
• Competition
e Economics
e Education
For the most part, regulations address disincentive. They don't say how a
characteristic must be achieved, although FAA advisory circulars tend to promote
methodologies by describing acceptable approaches, but describe what minimum
characteristics an aircraft must have before it can be sold and what requirements
optional functions must have. Regulations principally address safety and truth
of advertising (satisfaction of intended function).
There's little doubt that the regulations governing automatic landing systems
are responsible for the relatively high levels of performance of these systems in
variable winds, although the homogeneous boundary-layer wind and turbulence models
suggested may be lacking in accuracy and severity. Perhaps more important than
updating these models is the application Of similar treatment to other terminal
area automatic modes.
Except for the automatic landing system, there is no quantitative minimum
requirement for wind hazard survivability. Wind and turbulence models for auto-
matic landing system simulation are analytic and parameterized. Minimum require-
ments are specified in terms of tower wind component levels and variation of
horizontal wind with altitude. Minimum requirements are low and aircraft manu-
facturers usually seek certification to higher wind levels to enable automatic
landings for more conditions. The_test, however, is against the objective cer-
tification level. Seldom are efforts made to determine the maximum level of
wind hazard the system is capable of surviving. There are no requirements for
simulation demonstration of survivability in the severe non-homogeneous wind
disturbances such as microbursts and storm fronts, although aircraft manufacturers
do test these systems in simulations of these severe hazards.
An obvious question arises: Should regulations require minimum wind hazard
flight control survivability, at least for terminal area operation? Requirements
do exist for structural survivability. Such requirements would involve specifi-
cation of the wind hazard model and a means for measuring success. The require-
ment should not specifically address automatic systems, rather automatic systems
would be one of several means for showing compliance. Capability in excess of
the minimum requirements could be rated; then this rating, similar to the auto-
mobile's estimated miles per gallon, could be a means for spurring competition
and increasing awareness.
Part of the incentive for providing automatic systems is lost because
regulations have two standards for manually and automatically controlled flight,
and because they do not give credit for the superior performance of the automatic
system. For example, although an automatic landing system may clearly demonstrate
greater survivability in a wind shear hazard than manual flying, that same auto-
matic system will likely be certified to conduct automatic landings in wind con-
ditions less severe than is the pilot. This is because manual landing capability
and performance are not based on the same strict standards that apply to automatic
landing systems. Additionally, though approach airspeeds are not increased for
increased wind severity for automatic landing systems as they normally are for
manual flying, and though an automatic system may demonstrate much less likelihood
of touching down long than a pilot, the field length requirements are the same for
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both. Field length requirements don't even reflect the tendency for manual
landings to touch downat higher speeds for more severe winds.
Newautomatic systems tend to be introduced only at the sametime as new
aircraft with a short development cycle, although additional features may be
added to an existing aircraft. This is the worst possible time to aggressively
seek the large potential benefits that entail technical and program risks.
There is great pressure to reduce goals and assure that a system with lesser capa-
bility works well; the superior characteristics of an automatic system will not
likely sell airplanes, but the inferior characteristics might prevent airplanes
from being sold. A high-performance automatic system requires good detail
models of aerodynamics, the control system, and sensors. Newprogram pressures
and the concurrent development of the airplane configuration, control system,
and sensors prohibit that detailed modeling.
The best time to develop or, at least, evolve a high-performance automatic
system is after an airplane is in production. If the evolution takes place,
there is less need to make large technological advances during the development
of the next new airplane.
The difficulty is convincing the customer he needs a new automatic system
when his present one is performing adequately, particularly if the purpose is
to enhance safety for what is perceived as an extremely remote event.
There is also a major role for education to play in eliminating disincentive.
The pilot must be convinced that the severe wind hazard he could not cope with
on the simulator is real, not an artificial contrivance, even though he never
has and likely never will experience a similar hazard in flight. The pilots
and airline passengers must be educated that attitude changes and engine modu-
lations are indicative of tight control necessary to insure safety in the event
that the change in wind experienced persists or subsequently changesmore
violently.
QUESTION:
Do you think that a realistic goal would be certification requirements
for the design of the airplane and systems that are compatible with the
airplane's performance?
RESPONSE:
I think the certification requirements of the automatic system are quite
precise, and that is probably more of a standard, although it's a very exhaustive
and expensive certification to go through. I guess what I was implying is that
they talk about the airplane's capability, but when they measure the airplane's
capability, it is actually an airplane/pilot capability. If you force the air-
plane pilot to go through the same kind of standards, then you probably would see
a disparity and would come up with different conclusions as to what the capa-
bilities wereL
QUESTION:
Could the logic of the system be designed such that it will extract the
maximum performance of the airplane through a given encounter?
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RESPONSE:
Unfortunately, there are two sides to the story. You always pay for
something that you get, particularly in the performance area, and particularly
in speed-control modes, which is your principal means for counteracting. That
is, under benign conditions, you may have more activity. Generally, the higher
performance you get, the higher the activity, and you will be pressured to
make sure that you are providing very good characteristics for the still-air
environment, even if it means sacrificing for the more severe. I say part of
that is going to come out of aducation, and maybe part of that comes out of
our regulations. It's going to take somewhat of a change of attitude.
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